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ABSTRACT
This paper uses the receipt of an inheritance to measure the effect of wealth shocks on retirement.
Using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), we first document that inheritance receipt is common
among older workers – one in five households receives an inheritance over an eight-year period, with
a median value of about $30,000. We find that inheritance receipt is associated with a significant
increase in the probability of retirement. In particular, we find that receiving an inheritance increases
the probability of retiring earlier than expected by 4.4 percentage points, or 12 percent relative to the
baseline retirement rate, over an eight-year period. Importantly, this effect is stronger when the
inheritance is unexpected and thus more likely to represent an exogenous shock to wealth.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A widely accepted principle of economic theory is that leisure is a normal good, and thus 
that positive wealth shocks can be expected to lead to reductions in lifetime labor supply.  Yet it 
is difficult to obtain reliable empirical estimates of the wealth effect because wealth is often 
correlated with unobservable characteristics that affect labor supply, such as taste for leisure or 
risk aversion.
1  In this paper, we leverage the fact that an inheritance, particularly if it is 
unexpected, may generate a shock to wealth that allows one to identify the effect of wealth on 
retirement behavior.   
Inheritances are also interesting in their own right because of their importance for many 
households.  Brown and Weisbenner (2004) find that more than one in five households has 
received a substantial transfer.  Strong returns in housing and equity markets over the past 
several decades have led some analysts to suggest that inherited wealth may become increasingly 
important in the coming decades.  For example, Schervish and Havens (2003) predict that from 
1998 to 2052, over $45 trillion of wealth (in 2002 dollars) will be transferred from final estates.
2   
In considering the effect of inheritance receipt on labor supply, it is particularly 
interesting to focus on retirement for several reasons.  First, given the life expectancies of 
today’s elderly, many households will receive inheritances when they are of near-retirement age.  
For example, among older households in the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances who report ever 
having received an inheritance, more than half received one at ages 50-65.
3  Second, if workers 
have little flexibility along the hours dimension and most inheritances are too small to allow 
                                                 
1 For surveys of the large literature estimating the effect of unearned income on labor supply, see Pencavel (1986), 
Blundell and MaCurdy (2000), and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986). 
 
2 Not all analysts agree with the idea that inheritances are likely to grow in importance as a source of wealth for 
future retirees.  Gokhale and Kotlikoff (2000), for example, point out that for most households, inheritances are 
small relative to lifetime labor earnings. 
 
3 Authors’ calculations.   2 
young workers to retire immediately, the greatest labor supply response to inheritance receipt 
may lie in the retirement response of older workers.  Third, there is strong general policy interest 
in understanding how wealth affects retirement behavior.  For example, one of the pathways 
through which Social Security or private pension reform might influence retirement behavior is 
through wealth effects, and thus it is important for policy analysis to develop an empirical 
foundation for understanding wealth effects, as distinct from other pathways.  
To our knowledge, there are only two previous studies (Holtz-Eakin et. al., 1993; 
Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994) that have tried to examine the effect of inheritance receipt on labor 
supply.   Unfortunately, these two papers shed little light on the effect of inheritance receipt on 
the retirement decisions of older workers; the former uses a sample of younger workers only, 
while the latter obtains inconsistent results for older workers, with some specifications even 
suggesting that inheritance receipt reduces the likelihood of retirement.  In addition, these studies 
are unable to distinguish between expected and unexpected inheritances.  This distinction is 
potentially important in estimating wealth effects because if households who expect an 
inheritance adjust their behavior prior to actually receiving it, then an estimate that is based on 
total inheritances may underestimate of the true effect of wealth shocks on behavior.   
In this paper, we explore the effect of inheritance receipt on retirement using data from 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for the 1994 to 2002 period.  We begin by providing 
descriptive statistics documenting the empirical importance of inheritances for this population 
and the accuracy of inheritance expectations.  Turning to our main empirical analysis, we first 
simply estimate whether inheritance receipt increases the probability of labor force exit.  
However, because this initial approach is subject to a number of concerns about household 
expectations, we then turn to our preferred specification, which examines whether the receipt of   3 
an inheritance – particularly an unexpected one – causes the individual to retire earlier than 
expected.  By comparing actual inheritance receipt and retirement behavior to what the same 
individual expected at the beginning of the sample period, we are able to directly and indirectly 
control for most factors that might otherwise lead to a spurious correlation between inheritance 
receipt and retirement behavior.   
We have several findings.  First, we find that inheritances are empirically important for 
the young elderly.  Over an eight-year period, approximately one in five households receives an 
inheritance; the median value of those inheritances is about $30,000.  Many inheritances are 
unexpected, as indicated by respondent’s self-reported probability of inheritance receipt at the 
beginning of the sample period, but for those who do expect to receive an inheritance, the 
received value is correlated with the conditional value of the expected inheritance.  Second, we 
find that inheritance receipt is associated with a significant increase in the probability of 
retirement and that the magnitude of the response is increasing in the size of the inheritance.  
Third, we find that the effect of an inheritance is greater when the inheritance is unexpected, 
suggesting that previous estimates may underestimate the true effect of a wealth shock by 
combining expected and unexpected inheritances.  Overall, our findings confirm the existence of 
non-trivial wealth effects on retirement behavior. 
 
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
While there is a vast literature on how various financial considerations influence labor 
supply decisions, only a small number of studies have attempted to isolate the effect of a wealth 
shock on labor supply.  Interestingly, the evidence from this literature is not uniformly 
supportive of wealth having a large effect.  For example, while Imbens et. al. (2001) find that   4 
lottery winners consume some of their winnings in the form of reduced labor earnings and that 
the effect is larger for older winners, Krueger and Pischke (1992) find little evidence of an 
increase in labor supply for workers in the Social Security “notch” cohort, who experienced a 
dramatic reduction in Social Security wealth due to a law change.  Similarly, while Coronado 
and Perozek (2003) and Sevak (2001) find that unanticipated stock market gains led workers to 
retire earlier, Coile and Levine (2006) find no effect of stock market fluctuations on retirement.      
Two earlier studies have examined the effect of inheritance receipt on labor supply.  
Holtz-Eakin et. al. (1993) use a sample of estate tax returns from the early 1980s matched to the 
income tax returns of recipients before and after inheritance receipt.  They find that recipients are 
more likely to exit the labor force when they receive a larger inheritance.  However, their sample 
is limited to recipients age 19 to 58, and because excluding most of the retirement age 
population, they are unable to observe how the inheritance influences subsequent retirement 
behavior.  Using the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) find 
small effects of inheritance receipt on hours worked for prime-age workers.  They find 
inconsistent effects on labor force exit by older workers, possibly due to a small sample size.   
Our analysis is the first to use the HRS to estimate the effect of inheritance receipt on 
retirement.  The HRS offers many advantages for the study of this question.  First, there are a 
large number of inheritance recipients among older workers in the HRS, giving us the 
opportunity to improve upon the inconclusive results of the past literature.  Second, we are able 
to include a richer set of covariates than was used in prior studies.  Third, the HRS provides data 
on ex ante inheritance expectations, which we use to test whether the effect of inheritance receipt 
depends on whether the inheritance is anticipated. As authors of previous studies have noted, the 
inability to distinguish between inheritances that are expected and unexpected introduces a   5 
potential downwards bias in estimates of wealth effects, as the adjustment to an expected 
inheritance may have already occurred prior to receipt.  Finally, the HRS has data on retirement 
expectations, which we use to help control for unobserved characteristics that may be correlated 
with both inheritance receipt and retirement. 
In addition to offering an appealing way to estimate wealth effects, studying the effect of 
inheritances on retirement is of more general interest due to the very small but growing literature 
on the effect of inheritance receipt on household behavior more generally.  In addition to the two 
labor supply papers already discussed, Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) and Holtz-Eakin et. al. 
(1994a, 1994b) find that inheritance receipt is associated with an increased probability of 
becoming an entrepreneur.  Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) also look at the effect of receipt on 
consumption.  While there are numerous other papers focusing on inheritances, most of it has 
focused on implications for aggregate wealth accumulation
4 or on the reasons that households 
make bequests.
5  Studying the behavioral responses to inheritance receipt can help us to better 
understand the implications of these substantial intergenerational transfers for aggregate labor 
supply and savings behavior.          
 
 
                                                 
4 Kotlikoff & Summers (1981) initiated this debate by arguing that most wealth is inherited, counter to implication 
of the life-cycle models of Modigliani & Brumberg (1954) and Ando & Modigliani (1963) that most wealth is 
saved.  Subsequent articles have offered wide-ranging estimates of the share of net worth due to transfers and have 
clarified the reasons for the differences; see Modigliani (1988), Kotlikoff (1988), Kessler and Masson (1989), Gale 
& Scholz (1994), Gale & Slemrod (2000), and Brown and Weisbenner (2004). 
 
5 Some of the leading theories include that households derive utility from making a bequest (Yaari, 1964) or directly 
from their children’s consumption (Barro, 1974), that parents use bequests to influence their children’s behavior 
(Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers, 1985), or that many bequests are unintentional (Davies, 1981).  See Bernheim 
(1991), Wilhelm (1996), Perozek (1998), McGarry (1999) McGranahan (2000), Page (2003), and Light and 
McGarry (2004) for tests of these theories in the context of bequests and Cox (1987), Cox and Rank (1992), and 
McGarry and Schoeni (1995, 1997) for tests in the context of inter vivos gifts. 
   6 
 3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INHERITANCES 
  The data set for the analysis is the Health and Retirement Study.  The HRS began in 1992 
as a survey of people who were ages 51-61 and their spouses, with re-interviews of these 
individuals every two years.
6  We use data from waves 2 through 6 (1994-2002) in the analysis 
because data on inheritance expectations is not available until wave 2.   
The HRS provides richly detailed data on respondents’ labor supply, health, and finances.  
For our purposes, a critical feature of the HRS is that it provides information on inheritances at 
each wave, including whether any inheritances were received since the last wave, the value of 
any inheritances received, the respondent’s self-reported probability of receiving an inheritance 
over the next ten years, and the conditional value of the expected inheritance.  Individuals who 
give a positive probability of inheritance receipt but are unable to provide a conditional value are 
asked a series of questions that allow for the value of the expected inheritance to be put into one 
of the following brackets: $0 to $10,000; $10,000 to $50,000; $50,000 to $250,000; $250,000 to 
$1,000,000; or over $1,000,000.  The second important feature of the HRS is that we can follow 
the same individuals over time, which allows us to look at how behavior changes following 
inheritance receipt. 
We begin our analysis with an overview of the empirical importance of inheritances for 
HRS workers nearing retirement age, the characteristics of inheritance recipients, and the 
accuracy of inheritance expectations.
7  We find that inheritance receipt is quite common in the 
HRS population: 5.4 percent of workers are in households that receive an inheritance over a two-
                                                 
6 Starting in 1998, additional birth cohorts were added to the HRS; however, this analysis focuses on the original 
HRS cohort.  For some labor force and demographic variables, we make use of the RAND version of the HRS, a 
user-friendly subset of the data that offers cleaned and consistent variables. 
 
7 We defer detailed discussion of the samples used for these calculations until the next section of the paper.  
Calculations that refer to inheritance receipt over a two-year period are based on our “person-wave” sample, while 
calculations that refer to receipt over the full eight-year sample period are based on our “long-difference” sample.  
   7 
year period as are 19.3 percent of workers over an eight-year period. When weighted by dollars 
received, the majority of inheritances come from parents (72 percent) or aunts and uncles (7 
percent); source missing (15 percent) is the other significant category. 
  Many of these inheritances are quite substantial, as reported in Table 1.  The mean and 
median values for inheritance received by workers over a two-year period are about $67,000 and 
$28,000, respectively, indicating that the distribution of inheritance values is highly skewed; 
indeed, one-quarter of inheritance recipients receive less than $10,000 while the top 5 percent 
receive inheritances in excess of $280,000.
8  Table 1 also shows the value of inheritances relative 
to net worth and household income.  The median inheritance is equivalent to nearly 11 percent of 
net worth and four months of household income; the top 5 percent of inheritances are more than 
1.5 times net worth or three years of household income. 
  Table 2 shows the characteristics of inheritance recipients and non-recipients in the HRS.  
Recipients are slightly younger, as might be expected, because younger people are more likely to 
have parents that are still alive.  Recipients and non-recipients are equally likely to be female but 
recipients are more likely to be white and married.  In general, recipients have higher 
socioeconomic status – they are in better health, have more education, and have higher 
household income and net worth prior to inheritance receipt. 
  Next, we turn to inheritance expectations.  Figure 1 is a histogram showing the 
respondent’s self-reported probability of receiving an inheritance over the next 10 years, as 
reported at in 1994.  Nearly 60% of respondents report zero probability of receiving an 
inheritance.  The focal responses of 50% chance and 100% change are the next most common 
                                                 
8 The median value of inheritances shown on Table 3 is slightly higher, at $30,474.  The reason for the difference is 
that the latter measure includes all inheritances received over an eight-year period rather than the two-year period 
shown here and thus captures instances where households receive multiple inheritances over the longer period.     8 
answers, with about 10% of the sample selecting each of these responses, and the rest of the 
distribution is spread out fairly evenly. 
  Table 3 begins to assess the accuracy of inheritance expectations.  We compare 1994 
expectations of inheritance receipt during the next 10 years with actual inheritance receipt 
between 1994 and 2002, grouping respondents by expected probability of inheritance receipt.  
The third and fourth columns on the table show that the median conditional value of the expected 
inheritance and median value relative to household income rise with the expected probability of 
receipt.
9  The next column shows the fraction of each group who actually received an inheritance 
over an eight-year period.  Among the 60 percent of the sample who said there was no chance of 
getting an inheritance, more than 10 percent of them did receive one and the median value was 
$17,554 or 35 percent of household income.  The probability of receiving an inheritance rises 
with the probability of expecting one, but perhaps not as quickly as expected – fewer than 40 
percent of those who said they were certain to get an inheritance in the next ten years actually 
received one over our eight-year sample period.  The median value and value as a share of 
household income also generally rise with probability of receipt.  It is interesting to note that by 
probability group, the median received inheritance is fairly similar to the median expected 
inheritance. 
While the medians are similar, it may still be the case that many individuals under-
estimate or over-estimate their inheritance.  Tables 4a and 4b explore this point by generating a 
cross-tab of conditional expected and received inheritance values.   Table 4a includes everyone 
in the sample (inheritance recipients and non-recipients), while Table 4b includes recipients only.   
                                                 
9 For this table only, in cases where respondents reported a positive probability of inheritance receipt and could not 
provide a conditional value of the expected inheritance but did answer the bracket questions, we assign them a 
conditional value equal to the midpoint of the bracket (or $2,000,000 for the very few observations in the over 
$1,000,000 bracket).  As discussed more below, we do not use these values in our empirical analysis.  
   9 
The values on the diagonal, shown in bold, represent the fraction of the sample that accurately 
predicted their inheritance; we define the categories according to the values in the inheritance 
expectation bracket questions, allowing us to include people who could not provide a conditional 
value for the expected inheritance but did answer these questions.   
Table 4a shows that for any conditional value of the expected inheritance, the vast 
majority of workers are in the first column, meaning that they received no inheritance.  For 
example, among those who expected an inheritance of $10,000 to $50,000 within the next ten 
years, nearly two-thirds had not received an inheritance eight years later.  This might make it 
seem that expectations and receipt are only loosely related, but Table 4b tells a somewhat 
different story.  Among those who expected and received an inheritance, workers with a given 
conditional value are more likely to be in the diagonal cell (the conditional value matches the 
received value) than any of the other cells in their row.   For example, of those who expected an 
inheritance of $10,000 to $50,000 and received an inheritance, 40 percent got an inheritance 
value in this range.  Nonetheless, there are many workers in the off-diagonal cells as well, with 
inheritances both larger and smaller than expected.  We make use of the fact that received 
inheritances are unexpectedly larger for some and smaller for others in the analysis below. 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
  There are numerous possible approaches to estimating the effect of inheritances on 
retirement, each with its own advantages and disadvantages.  In particular, there are at least three 
dimensions along which the researcher must choose to specify the problem.  First, one must 
needs to define the dependent variable of interest.  Second, one must determine an appropriate   10 
measure of inheritance receipt.  Third, one must determine the time horizon over which to 
examine behavior.   
  In order to fully explore the robustness of our results, we adopt multiple approaches 
along each of these dimensions.  To initially establish whether there is a correlation between 
inheritance receipt and retirement, we first define retirement as “exit the labor force” and run the 
following regression: 
it t it it it X retire e g b b b + + + + = 2 1 0 e inheritanc         (1) 
In our initial specification, retireit is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual has exited the 
labor force since the previous wave, inheritanceit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household 
received an inheritance since the previous wave, and time horizon is a two-year wave of the 
HRS.  Because retirement is the behavior of interest, the sample is limited to individuals who 
were working at the previous wave.  If both spouses are in the labor force at the previous wave, 
both will be included in our regression.  Because our measure of inheritance receipt is at the 
household level, we will cluster the standard errors on the household identifier to reflect any 
within household correlation in the response to the inheritance receipt.  When using person-wave 
observations, we have 17,801 observations.
10   
Xit is a vector of demographic characteristics including age dummies, race/ethnicity, 
gender, marital status, a dummy for poor health status at the previous wave and the change in 
this dummy, a cubic in own earnings from the previous wave, a cubic in household income from 
                                                 
10 As detailed below, in some specifications we make use of data on expectations of inheritance receipt, which are 
first asked at wave 2.  To use a consistent sample throughout the analysis, we start our person-wave sample with 
persons working at wave 2 and observe whether they retire by wave 3.  As our data extends through wave 6, each of 
the HRS’ 12,652 respondents may provide up to 4 observations to the person-wave sample.  Starting with a potential 
sample of 50,608 person-wave observations, the sample is selected as follows: we lose 12,426 observations because 
the individual died, left the sample, or was divorced or separated before wave 6; 4,603 observations because the 
individual did not report a probability of inheritance receipt; 1,018 observations because the individual failed to 
report a conditional value for the expected inheritance or answer the bracket questions, and 14,760 observations 
because the individual was not working at the previous wave.     11 
the previous wave, and a cubic in lifetime wages
11, net worth at previous wave, education level 
dummies, pension type dummies, industry and occupation dummies, and region dummies.  ￿t is a 
wave fixed effect.    
As a second specification, we replace the inherit dummy with the dollar value of the 
inheritance to test whether the magnitude of the response is increasing with the size of the 
inheritance.   A third specification scales the value of the inheritance by the household’s income 
at the wave prior to receipt. 
We will then alter our time horizon, and analyze the effect of inheritance receipt (using 
each of our three measures) during the entire sample period (1994-2002) on the labor force exit 
over this period.  We refer to this as the “long-difference” estimation.  In this approach, each 
individual contributes one observation to the sample, conditional on being in the labor force at 
wave 2.
12  The long-difference approach can potentially include longer-term responses to 
inheritance receipt, while the original approach will focus on more immediate responses.  In 
addition, the long-difference approach matches up somewhat better with the questions about 
inheritance expectations, which ask about receipt over the next ten years.  In our long-difference 
sample, we have 4,508 observations.  
  After discussing the above results in Table 5, we will then turn to our preferred 
specification in Table 6 that makes use of the expectations data in the HRS.  In particular, we 
will introduce two innovations.  First, we use as our new dependent variable whether or not the 
individual retired earlier than expected, where expectations about retirement are measured as of 
                                                 
11 Lifetime wages are defined as the sum both spouses’ real earnings from ages 25 – 50 based on Social Security 
administrative records.  For those observations missing earnings records, we use the median earnings for that 
individual’s gender and education group. 
 
12 The same sample selection criteria discussed for the person-wave sample apply here as well.  For example, if the 
respondent dies before wave 6 or does not report a probability of inheritance receipt, he or she is not in the sample.   12 
wave 1.
13  This approach allows us to control for a wide range of unobservable factors that might 
be correlated with both retirement behavior and inheritance receipt.  For example, if individuals 
who receive inheritances also happen to have a stronger taste for leisure, then this information 
would already be incorporated into their expectations about retirement.  By comparing actual to 
expected retirement dates, we can determine whether the receipt of an inheritance influenced this 
individual’s behavior, while controlling for these other factors.   
Second, we can regress this difference in actual and expected retirement date on measures 
of inheritance receipt that differentiate between expected and unexpected inheritances.  This 
combination essentially allows us to examine the change in retirement (actual minus expected) 
on the change in inheritance.  By comparing changes in retirement and inheritance expectations, 
we are controlling for numerous unobservable characteristics of the individual in much the same 
way that individual fixed effects would do.  
 
5. REGRESSION RESULTS 
5.1 Effects of Inheritance Receipt on Retirement 
Our first regression results are shown in Table 5, with results for the person-wave sample 
in the first three columns and those for the long-difference sample in the last three columns.
14  
                                                 
13 We would have preferred to use retirement expectations as of wave 2, since our data on inheritance expectations 
comes from wave 2, but were unable to do so due to data limitations.  To be specific, we use the variable r1rplnya 
from the RAND version of the HRS as our measure of the expected year of retirement.  As explained in St. Clair et. 
al. (2004), this variable incorporates the answers to several questions about expected date of retirement in different 
parts of the survey in order to provide non-missing data for as many observations as possible.  However, the HRS 
did not ask some of these questions in the wave 2 survey and thus the RAND data does not include a variable 
equivalent to r1rplnya for wave 2.  For reference, we use the variable r6retyr from the RAND data as our measure of 
the actual date of retirement. 
 
14 In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the household level to correct for arbitrary forms of serial 
correlation in the error term for members of the same household across survey waves. 
   13 
The model is estimated as a linear probability model for ease of interpretation.
15   We first 
discuss the person-wave results.  In specification 1, we find that receiving an inheritance is 
associated with a 2.4 percentage point increase in the probability of retirement over a two-year 
period, or 13 percent of the baseline retirement rate over a two-year period; the effect is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  In the next column, we test whether the response 
is increasing in the size of the inheritance by instead using the continuous value of the 
inheritance received.
16  This coefficient is positive and also significant at the 10 percent level.  
Increasing the value of the inheritance by $100,000 is found to increase the probability of 
retirement by 2.1 percentage points, or about 11 percent of the baseline retirement rate.  In the 
final column, we use the inheritance value scaled by household income at the previous wave, as 
it may be that it is the size of the inheritance relative to household finances that matters.  This 
variable also has a positive effect on retirement.  The effect is not statistically significant, but the 
magnitude is quite similar to the other coefficients on the table: an increase in the inheritance 
value equal to household income (about $55,000 for the median household) raises the probability 
of retirement by 1.1 percentage points. 
The second half of the table shows results for the long-difference sample, where the 
dependent variable is labor force exit over the full eight-year sample period.  The results are 
quite similar to those already discussed, except that the inheritance dummy and inheritance value 
coefficients are now significant at the 5 percent level rather than the 10 percent level.  The 
magnitudes of the coefficients are generally similar to those in the two-year change sample, 
though they are smaller relative to the baseline retirement rate in the long-difference sample.  For 
                                                 
15 We have also run all of our specifications using a probit model, and found the marginal effects to be very similar. 
 
16 To allow for the possibility of a non-linear effect of inheritances on retirement, we try including squared and cubic 
terms as well; however, these are never statistically different from zero and so the results are not shown here.     14 
example, receiving an inheritance raises the probability of retirement over the eight-year period 
by 3.6 percentage points, or 7 percent relative to baseline retirement over an eight-year period, 
and increasing the value of the inheritance by $100,000 raises the probability of retirement by 3 
percentage points, or about 5 percent relative to baseline retirement. 
In results not shown, we have also assessed the robustness of the estimates in Table 5 to 
several alternative measures of labor supply.  These include retirement defined based on the 
respondent’s self-report of transitioning from being not retired to being partly or completely 
retired, the change in the self-reported probability of working past 62 (which may pick up 
changes in expected retirement behavior that have not yet been realized), the change in hours 
worked (which may pick up responses on the intensive as well as extensive margin), and labor 
force re-entry.  In all cases the coefficients are of the expected sign, with inheritance receipt 
consistently reducing labor supply, and the effects are frequently statistically significant.  We 
conclude that the estimated effects of inheritance receipt on labor supply are quite robust. 
 
5.2 Results Using Expectations Data   
Our results indicate that the wealth shock a household experiences when it receives an 
inheritance leads to a significant reduction in the labor supply of household members.  There are, 
however, two limitations to these initial results.  First, inheritance receipt is not random in the 
population.  If, for example, individuals with wealthy parents are more likely to receive an 
inheritance and are also more likely to retire early even in the absence of an inheritance due to 
differences in both observable (e.g., education, income) and unobservable (e.g., financial 
knowledge, risk aversion) characteristics, then this would cause a spurious correlation between 
inheritance receipt and retirement.  Second, the receipt of an inheritance may not actually   15 
constitute a wealth shock for many households, because inheritances are often expected.   Some 
of the households that expect an inheritance may have adjusted their labor supply prior to 
inheritance receipt (for example, by having one spouse retire early) and thus there may be no 
change in their behavior when the inheritance actually arrives.  In this case, treating all 
inheritances as unexpected will tend to understate the true effect of wealth shocks on behavior.  
To address both of these concerns, we make use of the rich data on expectations in the 
HRS.  Specifically, we now define our dependent variable to be equal to one if the household 
retires earlier than expected, and zero otherwise.  To create this variable, we make use of the 
individual’s planned retirement year as reported in wave 1.  Because some respondents did not 
answer these questions in the survey, the sample size is reduced from 4,508 to 2,502 
observations.
17   
We also make use of expectations questions about inheritances in order to distinguish 
expected from unexpected inheritances.  Even with the rich information in the HRS, it is not 
necessarily clear how to delineate between expected and unexpected inheritances.  For example, 
an inheritance may be unexpected because the recipient did not expect to receive one at all, or it 
may be partially unexpected because the amount received was greater than expected.   
Therefore, we first divide inheritance recipients by whether they expected any inheritance 
(expected probability greater than zero) or not, a simple but appealing way to identify a group of 
individuals for whom the inheritance was truly unexpected.  Our calculations indicate that more 
                                                 
17 Our retired earlier than expected dummy is 1 for people who are retired by wave 6 and did so earlier than their 
expected retirement date, 0 for those who are retired by wave 6 and retired on time or later than their expected 
retirement date, and 0 for those who are still working at wave 6 and have passed their planned retirement date.  This 
variable is missing for those who do not report a planned retirement year (1,321 obs) or who have neither yet retired 
nor reached their planned retirement date (677 obs).  There is no significant difference in the probability of 
inheritance receipt among those observations with missing values of the retired earlier than expected dummy and 
those with non-missing values.    16 
than one-third of inheritance recipients had said there was no chance they would receive an 
inheritance over the next ten years.   
Next, to incorporate the idea that an inheritance may constitute a surprise by its size 
rather than its arrival, we classify recipients by whether they received more than they expected, 
less than expected, or about what they expected.  Since many of those who reported a positive 
probability of inheritance receipt could not give a conditional value of the inheritance but could 
answer questions that allow us to determine whether their expected inheritance falls in a 
particular range (e.g., $10,000 to $50,000), we define the more than expected dummy as 
receiving an inheritance that fell in a higher bracket than expected, and similarly for inheritances 
that were less than expected and about expected.
18  
The results of this analysis are shown on Table 6.  For ease of comparison with earlier 
results, we first estimate models with our new dependent variable and the same inheritance 
variables used in Table 5.  The coefficients on the prior inheritance variables are all significant at 
the 10 percent level or better, even the inheritance value scaled by household income, and are 
somewhat larger relative to the mean of the dependent variable than those for the long-difference 
sample on Table 5.  For example, receiving an inheritance increases the probability of retiring 
earlier than expected by 4.4 percentage points, or 12 percent relative to the baseline.  Increasing 
the value of the inheritance by $100,000 increases the probability of retirement by 4.5 percentage 
points.   
                                                 
18 While it is tempting to try to decompose the value of the inheritance into its expected and unexpected components 
using the difference between the received value and the conditional value or expected value, such attempts are 
stymied by the large number of people who expect an inheritance but do not report its conditional value (about 40% 
of those who give a positive probability of inheritance receipt).  Thus, it is not clear how much of their inheritance 
should be considered expected vs. unexpected.  The approach we have adopted is, in our opinion, the cleanest way 
to test for differences between expected and unexpected inheritances given the available data. 
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The final three columns on the table display the results including our new right-hand side 
variables.  When we include the two dummy variables for having received an expected or an 
unexpected inheritance in column 4, we fail to find a stronger effect of unexpected inheritances; 
its coefficient is somewhat larger than the coefficient on expected inheritances, but they are not 
statistically different from each other or individually different from zero.   
One possible explanation for these findings, however, is that unexpected inheritances 
may be smaller than expected inheritances, so that the results in column 4 are confounding the 
size of the inheritance with whether it was a surprise.  Indeed, the median expected inheritance is 
$40,135 while the median unexpected inheritance is $17,554.  Thus, in column 5, we instead use 
as our key independent variables the value of the inheritance for those with expected inheritances 
and the value for those with unexpected inheritances.  Now the expected result emerges.  The 
effect of a given dollar amount of inheritance on the probability of retiring early is more than 
twice as large if the inheritance is unexpected, so that the effect of raising the inheritance value 
by $100,000 is to increase the probability of retiring early by 3.8 percentage points if the 
inheritance is expected or by 8.4 percentage points if it is unexpected.  Each coefficient is 
individually significantly different from zero, but more importantly, the difference between the 
two coefficients is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
In the final column of Table 6, we allow for the possibility that even an expected 
inheritance may be unexpected in its size by including dummy variables for whether the 
inheritance was more than expected, less than expected, or about what was expected (where 
expected means within the same “bracket,” e.g. $10,000-$50,000).  Here too the results suggest a 
stronger effect of unexpected inheritances.  Receiving an inheritance that is larger than expected 
raises the probability of retiring early by 5.5 percentage points, and this effect is significant at the   18 
10 percent level.  The coefficient on receiving an inheritance that is less than expected is 
negative (but not different from zero) and the two coefficients are statistically different from 
each other at the 10 percent level.  Overall, our results indicate that inheritances that are either 
entirely unexpected or unexpectedly large have larger effects on retirement than expected 
inheritances. 
 
6.  FURTHER DISCUSSION 
While we have found support for our hypothesis that inheritances have larger effects 
when they are unanticipated, we pause to consider factors that might make it difficult to find a 
stronger effect of unexpected inheritances in the data.   
One possible issue is that that there may be measurement error in respondents’ self-
reported probability of inheritance receipt and conditional value of the expected inheritance, so 
that our measures of expected and unexpected inheritances are both quite noisy.  While it is 
undoubtedly the case that our delineation between expected and unexpected bequests is noisy, 
Tables 3 and 4 show that the subjective probability questions on inheritances contain useful 
information, as the self-reported probability of inheritance receipt is correlated with actual 
receipt and the received value is correlated with the conditional value.  Furthermore, our 
measures are constructed so as to not rely very heavily on the specific probability of inheritance 
receipt or exact value of the expected inheritance.  However, given our need to classify 
inheritances based on the bracket values, it is possible that inheritances are labeled “about as 
expected” when they are either far more or less than expected (e.g., if a respondent expects 
$100,000 and receives $225,000), or conversely classified as “more than expected” when in fact 
the unexpected component is not very large (e.g., if a respondent expects $45,000 and receives   19 
$55,000).  Thus, it is possible that the difference between the effect of expected and unexpected 
inheritances on retirement is larger than what we have found here.   
  Another potential factor that may affect the interpretation of our results is the role played 
by liquidity constraints.  Workers who expect inheritances might wish to consume some of their 
inheritance prior to receipt and retire earlier, but be unable to do so because they cannot borrow 
against the inheritance and hold few assets or mostly illiquid assets.  If so, this will tend to make 
the effect of expected and unexpected inheritances more similar.   
To explore this, we experimented with three measures of liquidity constraints, including 
“has financial assets < $5,000,” “has financial assets < $10,000,” and “has financial assets < 20% 
of income.”  By interacting these with our measures of inheritance receipt, we can test whether 
there is a differential response to the inheritance based on liquidity.  These results did not 
produce a consistent pattern of there being a stronger response to inheritance receipt by liquidity-
constrained households.     
These results, however, should not be interpreted as evidence that liquidity constraints are 
not important, for at least two reasons.  First, our three measures are, admittedly, poor proxies for 
liquidity constraints.  Indeed, the literature in this area suggests that good proxies for liquidity 
constraints are extremely difficult to find.  In this context, the problem is made even more 
intractable by the fact that most proxies of liquidity constraints (such as measures of financial 
assets, levels of debt, etc.) may be endogenously determined with inheritance expectations.  In 
other words, a household that is expecting an inheritance might save less and/or borrow more in 
an attempt to smooth out the consumption effects of the future bequest.        
        A final theory is that recipients may be reluctant to act upon as-yet-unrealized 
inheritances because inheritance receipt is uncertain.  To use a common expression, “a bird in the   20 
hand is worth more than a bird in the bush.”  Conceptually, it would be more appropriate to use 
the certainty equivalent of the expected inheritance as the portion that is expected. Unfortunately, 
calculating the certainty equivalent is not possible with the data available to us, as we would 
need to know the individual’s full probability distribution of inheritance receipt, as well as 
parameters of the individual’s utility function.
19  In sum, measurement error, liquidity 
constraints, and risk aversion over the size of the inheritance suggest that the difference between 
the effect of unexpected and expected inheritance receipt on behavior may well be even greater 
than what we find. 
     
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Inheritances represent a shock to wealth that may provide a useful way to estimate the 
effect of wealth on labor supply.  Our paper provides new evidence on the effect of inheritance 
receipt on retirement using the HRS, which has a large number of inheritance recipients among 
its sample of older workers and includes data on ex-ante inheritance and retirement expectations.   
We find that inheritance receipt is associated with a significant increase in the probability 
of retirement and that the effect is increasing in the size of the inheritance.  These findings 
contrast with those of the previous literature, which failed to find large and consistent effects of 
inheritance receipt on retirement.  We find that the effect is more than twice as large when the 
inheritance is unexpected, suggesting that earlier studies may have underestimated the wealth 
effect due to an inability to distinguish between expected and unexpected inheritances.  Our 
                                                 
19 We have conducted weaker tests of whether uncertainty matters based on the measure of risk aversion available in 
the data (based on answers to questions about income gambles), on the theory that those who are relatively less risk 
averse will be more willing to spend expected inheritances prior to receipt, so they will respond less to inheritance 
receipt than will the most risk averse individuals.  However, we do not find any evidence that response to 
inheritance receipt depends on risk aversion.     21 
findings may be of use to economists and policy makers seeking to project the effect of other 
wealth changes on retirement, such as those that might result from changes to Social Security. 
A second contribution of our work is that we document that inheritance receipt is an 
important phenomenon for households nearing retirement age.  About 20 percent of HRS 
respondents receive an inheritance over an eight-year period and these inheritances can be quite 
substantial, with a median value of about $30,000.  When a household receives an inheritance, it 
can spend it in a variety of ways – by reducing labor supply and increasing the consumption of 
leisure, by increasing its consumption of goods and services, or by increasing transfers to family 
and friends via bequests or inter vivos gifts.  Studying some of these other behavioral responses 




Abel, Andrew B., 1985. “Precautionary Savings and Accidental Bequests,” American Economic 
Review 75, 777-791. 
 
Ando, A. and F. Modigliani, 1963. “The `Life-Cycle’ Hypothesis of Saving: Aggregate 
Implications and Test,” American Economic Review 53, 55-84. 
 
Barro, Robert J., 1974. “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?” Journal of Political Economy 82, 
1095-1117. 
 
Blanchflower, David and Andrew J. Oswald, 1998.  “What Makes an Entrepreneur? Evidence on 
Inheritance and Capital Constrains,” Journal of Labor Economics 16: 26-60. 
 
Bernheim, B. Douglas, Andrei Shleifer, and Lawrence H. Summers, 1985. “The Strategic 
Bequest Motive,” Journal of Political Economy 93, 1045-1076. 
 
Bernheim, B. Douglas, 1991. “How Strong Are Bequest Motives? Evidence Based on Estimates 
of the Demand for Life Insurance and Annuities,” Journal of Political Economy 99, 899-927. 
 
Blundell, Richard and Thomas MaCurdy (2000).  “Labor Supply,” in Orley Ashenfelter and 
David Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics.  Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
Brown, Jeffrey R. and Scott J. Weisbenner, 2004.  “Intergenerational Transfers and Savings 
Behavior,” in Perspectives on the Economics of Aging, David A. Wise, ed.  (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press). 
 
Coile, Courtney C. and Phillip B. Levine.  “Bulls, Bears, and Retirement Behavior.” Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 59(3):408-429, April 2006.   
 
Coronado, Julia and Maria Perozek (2003).  “Wealth Effects and the Consumption of Leisure: 
Retirement Decisions During the Stock Market Boom of the 1990s,” Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics Discussion Series #2003-20. 
 
Cox, Donald, 1987. “Motives for Private Income Transfers,” Journal of Political Economy 95, 
508-546. 
 
Cox, Donald and Mark R. Rank, 1992. “Inter-Vivos Transfers and Intergenerational Exchange,” 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 74, 305-314.  
 
Gale, W., and J. Scholz, 1994.  “Intergenerational Transfers and the Accumulation of Wealth,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, 145-160. 
 
Gale and Slemrod, 2000. “Rethinking the Estate and Gift Tax: Overview,” in W. Gale and J. 
Slemrod, eds., Rethinking Estate and Gift Taxation (Washington, D.C.:  Brookings Institution).   23 
Gokhale, Jagadeesh and Lawrence Kotlikoff, 2002.  “The Impact of Social Security and Other 
Factors on the Distribution of Wealth,” in Martin Feldstein (ed.), The Distributions Aspects of 
Social Security and Social Security Reform.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, David Joulfaian, and Harvey S. Rosen, 1993.  “The Carnegie Conjecture: 
Some Empirical Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 413-435. 
 
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, David Joulfaian, and Harvey S. Rosen, 1994a. “Sticking It Out: 
Entrepreneurial Survival and Liquidity Constraints,” Journal of Political Economy, 53-75. 
 
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, David Joulfaian, and Harvey S. Rosen, 1994b.  “Entrepreneurial 
Decisions and Liquidity Constraints,” RAND Journal of Economics 25, 334-347. 
 
Imbens, Guido W., Donald B. Rubin, and Bruce I. Sacerdote, 2001.  "Estimating the 
Effect of Unearned Income on Labor Earnings, Savings, and Consumption:  Evidence 
from a Survey of Lottery Players."  American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 
(September), pp. 778–94. 
 
Joulfaian, David and Mark O. Wilhelm, 1994.  “Inheritance and Labor Supply,” Journal of 
Human Resources 29, 1205-1234. 
 
Kessler , D., and A. Masson, 1989.  “Bequest and Wealth Accumulation:  Are Some Pieces of 
the Puzzle Missing?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 141-152. 
 
Killingsworth, Mark and James Heckman (1986).  “Female Labor Supply: A Survey,” in Orley 
Ashenfelter and Richard Layard (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics.  Amsterdam: North-
Holland. 
 
Kotlikoff, L., and L. Summers, 1981.  “The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate 
Capital Accumulation,” Journal of Political Economy 89, 706-732. 
 
Kotlikoff, L., 1988.  “Intergenerational Transfers and Savings,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 2, 41-58. 
 
Light, Audrey and Kathleen McGarry, (2004, forthcoming). “Why Parents Play Favorites: 
Explanations for Unequal Bequests,” American Economic Review. 
 
McGarry, Kathleen M. and Robert F. Schoeni, 1995. “Transfer Behavior: Measurement and the 
Redistribution of Resources within the Family,” Journal of Human Resources 30: s184-226. 
 
McGarry, Kathleen M. and Robert F. Schoeni, 1997. “Transfer Behavior within the Family: 
Results from the Asset and Health Dynamics Survey,” The Journals of Gerontology 52B: 82-92. 
 
McGarry, Kathleen M., 1999.  “Inter Vivos Transfers and Intended Bequests,” Journal of Public 
Economics 73: 321-351. 
   24 
McGranaham, Leslie, 2000. “Charity and the Bequest Motive: Evidence from Seventeenth-
Century Wills,” Journal of Political Economy 108, 1270-1291. 
 
Modigliani, F. and R. Brumberg, 1954. “Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function: An 
Interpretation of Cross-Section Data,” in K. Kurihara, ed., Post-Keynesian Economics (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press). 
 
Modigliani, F., 1988.  “The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in the 
Accumulation of Wealth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, 15-40. 
 
Pencavel, John, 1986.  “Labor Supply of Men: A Survey,” in Orley Ashenfelter and Richard 
Layard (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics.  Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
Perozek, Maria G., 1998. “A Reexamination of the Strategic Bequest Motive,” Journal of 
Political Economy 106, 423-445. 
 
Schervish, Paul G. and John J. Havens, 2003.  “Gifts and Bequests: Family or Philanthropic 
Organizations?” in Alicia H. Munnell and Annika Sunden (eds.), Death and Dollars: The Role of 
Gifts and Bequests in America.  Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Sevak, Purvi.  2001.  "Wealth Shocks and Retirement Timing:  Evidence from the 
Nineties."  Michigan Retirement Research Center, Working Paper WP00D1. 
 
St. Clair, Patricia, et. al.  2004.  “RAND HRS Data Documentation, Version D,” mimeo, RAND 
Corporation. 
 
Wilhelm, Mark O., 1996. “Bequest Behavior and the Effect of Heirs’ Earnings: Testing the 
Altruistic Model of Bequests,” American Economic Review 86, 874-892. 
 
Yaari, Menahem E, 1965. “Uncertain Lifetimes, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the 




  Mean 67,068           0.520 0.932
  5th %ile 1,620             0.005 0.025
  10th %ile 3,311             0.010 0.050
  25th %ile 9,444             0.039 0.144
  50th %ile 28,343           0.108 0.370
  75th %ile 72,857           0.331 1.020
  90th %ile 166,256         0.885 2.178
  95th %ile 280,218         1.660 3.458
Number of Obs 958 956 956
Note: Values are reported in $2002.







Characteristic Recipients Non-Recipients Significant
Difference?
Age 59.3 59.6 Yes (*)
Female  0.539 0.545 No
Non-white  0.079 0.174 Yes
Hispanic 0.023 0.072 Yes
Married 0.867 0.811 Yes
Poor Health 0.075 0.130 Yes
Education: HS Dropout 0.089 0.183 Yes
Education: HS Graduate 0.338 0.381 Yes
Education: Some College 0.238 0.217 No
Education: College Graduate 0.335 0.218 Yes
Pension Dummy 0.559 0.538 No
Net Worth at Previous Wave (median) 243,165 153,930 Yes
Household Income at Prev Wave (median) 54,973 71,834 Yes
Number of Observations 955 16,843
Note: * indicates that the difference is statistical significance at the 10% level.  All other 
differences are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Table 2: Characteristics of Inheritance Recipients,
HRS Person-Wave Sample
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Prob of % of  Median Median of % Who Median Median of
Inheritance Sample Cond. Value Cond. Value Received Value of  Inheritance/
Receipt of Expected of Expected Inheritance Inheritance 1994
in 1994 Inheritance Inheritance/ by 2002 Received HH Income
HH Income
0 0.598 0 0.000 0.109 17,554 0.350
.01-.25 0.113 12,139 0.226 0.181 18,021 0.339
.26-.49 0.020 24,278 0.420 0.190 17,199 0.486
0.50 0.083 36,417 0.617 0.245 39,231 0.597
.51-.75 0.042 36,417 0.667 0.329 35,728 0.618
.76-.99 0.054 60,695 0.872 0.367 63,219 0.741
1 0.088 60,695 0.893 0.388 48,592 0.708
All 1.000 0 0.000 0.178 30,474 0.500
Note: Values are reported in $2002.  The two final columns are conditional on receipt of an inheritance.
Table 3: Expected vs. Received Inheritances
HRS Long-Difference Sample  27 
Cond. Exp.
Inh. Value 0 >0 to 10K >10K to 50K >50K to 250K >250K to 1M >1M Total Obs
0 86.8 5.2 5.3 2.4 0.4 0.0 4,204
>0 to 10K 73.6 11.2 9.9 4.6 0.9 0.0 924
>10K to 50K 64.6 7.1 14.6 11.8 1.8 0.0 1,154
>50K to 250K 57.2 4.3 11.7 21.1 5.5 0.2 622
>250K to 1M 59.3 4.4 8.0 8.0 15.0 5.3 113
>1M 80.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10
Total 7,207
Note: Row percentages are shown in each cell; the total number of people in each row is shown in the last column.
Cond. Exp.
Inh. Value >0 to 10K >10K to 50K >50K to 250K >250K to 1M >1M Total Obs
0 39.7 38.4 18.6 3.3 0.0 456
>0 to 10K 43.6 35.2 17.3 4.0 0.0 202
>10K to 50K 20.4 39.8 34.1 5.7 0.0 334
>50K to 250K 8.7 26.2 51.4 13.3 0.5 218
>250K to 1M 13.5 16.2 24.3 29.7 16.2 37
>1M 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 2
Total 1,249
Note: Row percentages are shown in each cell; the total number of people in each row is shown in the last column.
Table 4a: Cross-Tabulation of Conditional Expected vs. Received Inheritances
Table 4b: Cross-Tabulation of Conditional Expected vs. Received Inheritances
HRS Long-Difference Sample: Inheritance Recipients
Actual Inheritance Value
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Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inheritance Flag 0.0241 * 0.0360 **
(.0132) (.0187)
Inheritance Value 0.0210 * 0.0295 **
(.0108) (.0074)
Inh Value / HH Income 0.0111 0.0107
(.0078) (.0076)
# of Obs 17,801 17,801 17,733 4,508 4,508 4,485
Mean of Depend Var 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.541 0.541 0.541
Note:
1) The sample is limited to individuals who were working at the previous wave.  The two-year change and long-
difference samples are described in more detail in the text.
2) Inheritance value is measured in 100,000s of $2002.
3) All regressions include controls for age, gender, marital status, race, education, current and lifetime income, 
net worth, health status, pension type, industry, occupation, region, and wave; see text for details.
4) * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level.
Table 5: Effect of Inheritance Receipt on Retirement
Long-Difference Sample Person-Wave Sample
Depend Var: Labor Force Exit
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Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inh Flag 0.0442 *
(.0250)
Inh Value 0.0448 **
(.0121)
Inh Value / HH Income 0.0359 **
(.0078)
Inh Flag - Expected 0.0379
(.0310)
Inh Flag - Unexpected 0.0536
(.0364)
Inh Value - Expected 0.0383 **
(.0126)
Inh Value - Unexpected 0.0836 **
(.0229)
Inh Flag - Amt Expected 0.0678
(.0453)
Inh Flag - Amt More 0.0547 *
(.0303)
Inh Flag - Amt Less -0.0622
(.0623)
# of obs 2,502 2,502 2,488 2,502 2,502 2,502
Mean of Depend Var 0.382 0.382 0.382 0.382 0.382 0.382
F-test: Exp=Unexp 0.726 0.079 0.083
(or Amt More=Amt Less)
Note:
1) The sample is limited to individuals who were working at the wave 2 and provided an expected retirement date
at wave 1.  The long-difference sample is described in more detail in the text.
2) Inheritance value is measured in 100,000s of $2002.
3) All regressions include controls for age, gender, marital status, race, education, current and lifetime income, 
net worth, health status, pension type, industry, occupation, region, and wave; see text for details.
4) * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level.
Table 6: Effect of Expected vs. Unexpected Inheritance Receipt on Retirement
Depend Var: Retire Earlier Than Expected
Long-Difference Sample  30 
Figure 1: Distribution of Expected Probability of 
Inheritance Receipt (1994 value)
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